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'\vhich go beyond the ordinary motives of commerce and 
partake of a political character, from a desire either to 
embarrass the one belligerent or to support the other. 
In the present case the agree1nent of the parties as to the 
amount to be a1lo\ved for freight disposes of all ques-
tion as to the claimants' rights to compensation for mere 
inconvenience caused by enforcing the order in council. 
Presumably that stun took into account the actual course 
and duration of the voyage and constituted a proper 
recompense alike for carrying and for discharging the 
cargo under the actual circumstances of that service. 
Charter party. The further claims are in the nature of claims for dam-
ages for unla,vful interference with the performance of the 
Rotterdam charter party. They can be maintained only 
by supposing that a '\Vrong was done to the claimants, 
because they were prevented from performing it, for in 
their nature these claims assume that the shipowners 
are to be put in the same position as if they had com-
pleted the voyage under that contract, and are not merely 
to be remunerated on proper terms for the performance 
of the voyage, which was in fact accomplished. In other 
words, they are a claim for damages, as for wrong done 
by the mere fact of putting in force the order in council. 
Decision. Such a claim can not be sustained. Their lordships will 
humbly advise IIis ~{ajesty that the appeal should be 
dismissed ,~vi th costs. 
THE "I.~EONORA." 
[PRIVY CouNCIL.] 
ON APPEAL FR.Ol\1 TI-IE PRIZE COURT, ENGLAND. 
July 31, 1919. 
[1919] A. C. 974. 
Appeals from decrees of the admiralty division (in 
prize) dated April 18, 1918. 77 
The appellants in the two appeals \Vere respectively 
the O'\vners of the Dutch stee:unship Leonora and the 
o'\vners of a cargo of coal 'vhich she 'vas carrying when 
captured. The ship and cargo 'vere seized and con-
demned under an order in council of February 16, 1917, 
kno,vn as the second retaliatory order. The facts 
appear from the judgment of their lordships. The order 
77 [1918] p . 18!?. 
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in council is fully set out in the report of the hearing 
before the president. 
July 31. The judgment of their lordships 'vas delivered th~t~!~~ent or 
by Lord Sumner. The Leonora, a Dutch steamship bound 
from Rotterdam to Stockhohn direct, was stopped on 
August 16, 1917, by His IV[ajesty's tropedo boat F7'1', 
outside territorial "raters, and shortly after passing 
Ymuiden. She was taken into Har,vich. Her cargo, 
'vhich was neutral owned, consisted of coal, the produce 
of collieries in Belgium. It was not intended that she 
should call at any British or allied port, nor had any 
application been made on her behalf for the appointment 
of a British port for the examination of her cargo. Both 
ship and cargo "rere condemned, pursuant to the order 
in council, elated February 16, 1917, and both the ship-
owners and the cargo owners appeal. 
1'heir lordships are satisfied that the cargo was "of 
enemy origin" 'vi thin the meaning of paragraphs 2 and 3 Enemy origin. 
of that order. The term had been used in the order of 
March 11, 1915, paragraph 4, and, o'ving to doubts as to 
the effect of the word "enemy" therein, a further order 
was made on January 10, 1917, which applied the tern1 .ordersincoun-
cll, Mar. 11, 1915, 
"enemy origin," as used in that paragraph, to goods Feb.16, 1917. 
"originating in any enemy country." In the present 
case, the question is one of the interpretation of the third 
order, that of February 16, 1917, "rhich, beyond saying 
that it is supplemental to the above-mentioned orders, 
makes no further express reference to them, but from the 
recital as to the recent proceedings of the German Govern-
ment, it is plain that the order of 1917 dealt with a wider 
mischief and "ras intended to have a wider scope than the 
previous order. It is therefore necessary to have regard 
to the system of exploitation then in force in Belgium for 
the advancement of German interests, in order to ap-
preciate the full effect of the words "enemy origin." It 
is not necessary to inquire 'vhether, 'vithin the terms of 
the order, a Belgian origin could, as such, be regarded as 
an "enemy" origin for this purpose, or 'vhat the effect, 
if any, of the Ger1nan occupation might be on the vie'v 
to be taken of the nationality of persons resident in 
Belgium. The collieries from 'vhich this coal came were 
included in the German "I(ohlenzentrale," a system by 
which the coal production of Belgium 'vas strictly con-
trolled and 'vas compulsorily Inanipulated, 'vith the 
object of supporting German exchange and assisting 
186 I:XTERNATION"AL LAW: DECISIO~S AND NOTES. 
German com G · l t t' · th t l t · mercial transac: erman commercia ransac Ions 'VI neu ra coun r1es, 
tions. especially Holland and Sweden. In particular, the 
export of Belgian coal to Sweden was encouraged, be-
cause it assisted to procure a reciprocal i~portation of 
ore from Sweden. The actual sale of this very cargo 
was arranged in Cologne by an official of the Kohlenzen-
trale in his o'vn name, nor is it proved that he ,Nas, in 
fact, selling on behalf of some undisclosed principal, 
either in Belgium or elsewhere. Payment for it was n1ade 
by lodging Swedish kroner in a Stockholm bank to the 
credit of the Kohlenzentrale. It is stated in the German 
regulations that "the amount realized by the sale 'vill 
be paid to the vendors," whoever they may have been. 
Perhaps this may have been so; for if no money at all 
reached the colliery, presumably the getting of coal there 
"\Vould come to an end; but whatever crumbs may have 
been allowed to fall from the masters' table, the fact is 
clear that these coals were won, sold, and shipped as 
part of a German Government trade, carried on for the 
benefit of the enemy in prosecuting the 'var. To deny 
to them the term "of enemy origin," as used in this order, 
'vould be pedantic. The order is devised to give effect 
to a scheme of retaliation, which 'vill compel the enemy 
to desist from outrageous conduct, by crippling or 
preventing trade in goods which in a broad, but very 
real, sense he made his own. It does not employ this 
expression ''of enemy origin'' as a mere geographical 
term, nor as merely descriptive of the nationality of the 
original owners of the coal, who were involuntary, and 
probably reluctant, victims of the German system. 
Upon this point the view of their lordships is that the 
learned president's conclusion was right. 
'l'he appellants' main case was that the order in council 
was invalid, principally on the ground that it pressed so 
hardly on neutral merchants and interfered so much 'vith 
their rights that, as against the1n, it could not be held to 
Reprisals. fall within such right of reprisal as a belligerent enjoys 
under the law of nations. A subordinate part of their 
argument was that in its application to the Leonora the 
order was bad, because no British port had been ap-
pointed at 'vhich she would call for the exa1nination of 
her cargo. In so far as this circumstance forms part of 
ne~t~~~~.ship to the general hardship to neutrals it ,vin be dealt 'vith 
presently. As a separate point their lordships think that 
it fails, for the language of the order in council does not 
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constitute the appointment of some British port for ex- na~~~~. of exami• 
arnination of the cargoes, either of this ship or of ships 
in general, a condition precedent to the application of 
the order. The proviso relieving vessels which call at 
an appointed port operates not as a prescription of the 
circumstances under which alone such application is ad-
missible, but merely as a mode of mitigating the strin-
gency of the order. The evidence discloses no reason 
why the appointment of a convenient port should not 
have been applied for to facilitate the Leonora's voyage, 
and a difficulty can not be relied on as a circumstance of 
excessive inconvenience to neutrals, which it was in their 
power to remove by such simple means. 
Upon the validity of the order in council itself th~ ap-
pellants advanced a twofold argument. The major prop-
osition was that the order purported to create an offense, 
namely, failure to call at a British or allied port, which 
is unknown to the law of nations, and to impose punish-
ment upon neutrals for committing it; in both respects it 
was said that the order is incompetent. The minor 
proposition was that the belligerent's right to take meas-
ures of retaliation, such as it is, must be limited, as 
against neutrals, by the condition that the exercise of 
that right must not inflict on neutrals an undue or dis-
proportionate degree of inconvenience. In the present 
case various circumstances of inconvenience were relied 
on, notably the perils of crossing the North Sea to a 
British port of call and the fact that no particular port 
of call in Great Brit.ain had been appointed for the vessel 
to proceed to. 
In the Stigstad 78 their lordships had occasion to con-
sider and to decide some at least of the principles upon 
which the exercise of the right of retaliation rests, and 
by those principles they are bound. In the present case, 
nevertheless, they have had the advantage of counsel's 
full reexamination of the whole subject, and full citation 
of the authorities, and of a judgment by the president in 
the prize court, which is itself a monument of research. 
The case furthermore has been presented under circum-
stances as favorable to neutrals as possible, for the dif-
ference in the stringency of the two orders in council, 
that of 1915 and that of 1917, is marked, since in the 
7t~ {1919) A. C. 279. 
59650-24--13 
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case of the later order the consequences of disregarding 
it have been increased in gravity and the burden imposed 
on neutrals has become more weighty. If policy or sym-
pathy can be invoked in any case they could be and 
were invoked here. 
']:'heir lordships, ho,vever, after a careful review of their 
opinion in the Stigstad, think that they have neither 
ground to modify, still less to doubt, that opinion, even 
if it were open to them to do so, nor is there any oc-
casion in the present case to embark on a general re-
statement of the doctrine or a minute reexamination of 
the authorities. 
ri~~s~ligeren t There are certain rights, which a belligerent enjoys by 
the law of nations in virtue of belligerency, which may be 
enforced even against neutral subjects and to the prej-
udice of their perfect freedom of action, and this because 
"\Vithout those rights maritime war would be frustrated 
and the appeal to the arbitrament of arms be made of 
none effect. Such for example are the rights of visit and 
search, the right of blockade and the right of preventing 
traffic in contraband of war. In some cases a part of 
the mode in which the right is exercised consists of some 
solemn act of proclamation on the part of the belligerent, 
by which notice is given to all the world of the enforce-
ment of these rights and of the limits set to their exercise. 
Such is the proclamation of a blockade and the notifica-
tion of a list of contraband. In these cases the belligerent 
sovereign does not create a new offense motu proprio; he 
does not, so to speak, legislate or create a new rule of 
law; he elects to exercise his legal rights and puts them 
into execution in accordance with the prescriptions of the 
existing law. Nor again in such cases does the retaliating 
Offit ce of a prize belligerent invest a court of prize with a new jurisdiction 
cour. 
or make the court his mandatory to punish a new offense. 
The office of a court of prize is to provide a formal and 
regular sanction for the law of nations applicable to mari-
time warfare, both between belligerent and belligerent 
and between belligerent and neutral. Whether the la"\v 
in question is brought into operation by the act of both 
belligerents in resorting to 'var, as is the case with the 
rules of internationalla"\v as to hostilities in general, or by 
the assertion of a particular right arising out of a particu-
lar provocation in the course of the "\Var on the part of 
one of them, it is equally the duty of a court of prize, by 
virtue of its general jurisdiction as such, to provide for 
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the regular enforcement of that right, when la,vfully 
asserted before it, and not to leave that enforcement to 
the mere jurisdiction of the sword. Disregard of a valid 
measure of retaliation is as against neutrals just as justi-
ciable in a court of prize as is breach of blockade or the 
carriage of contraband of war. The jurisdiction of a 
court of prize is at least as essential in the neutral's 
interest as in the interest of the belligerent, and if the 
court is to have power to release in the interest of the one, 
it must also have inherent power to condemn in justice 
to the other. Capture and condemnation are the pre-
scriptive and established modes by which the law of nations 
as applicable to maritime warfare is enforced. Statutes 
and international conventions may invest the court with 
other powers or prescribe other modes of enforcing the 
la,v, and the belligerent sovereign may in the appropriate 
form waive part of his rights and disclaim condemnation 
in favor of some milder sanction, such as detention. In 
the terms of the present order, which says that a vessel ca~:~~!u!~d co~~ 
(par.2) shall be "liable to capture and condemnation" demnation. 
and that goods (par.3 ) shall be "liable to condemnation," 
some a.rgument has been found for the appellants' main 
proposition, that the order in council creates an offense 
and attaches this penalty, but their lordships do not 
accept this view. The order declares, by way of warning 
and for the sake of completeness, the consequences which 
may follow from disregard of it; but, if the occasion has 
given rise to the right to retaliate, if the belligerent has 
validly availed himself of the occasion, and if the vessel 
has been encountered at sea under the circumstances 
mentioned, the right and duty to bring the ship and cargo 
before a court of prize, as for a justiciable offense against 
the right of the belligerent, has arisen thereupon, and the 
jurisdiction to condemn is that which is inherent in the 
court. That a rebuttable presumption is to be deemed 
to arise under paragraph 1, and that a saving proviso is 
added to paragraph 2, are modifications introduced by 
way of waiver of the sovereign's rights. Had they been 
omitted the true question would still have been the same, 
though arising in a more acute form, namely, does this 
exercise of the right of retaliation upon the enemy 
occasion inconvenience or injustice to a neutral, so ex-
treme as to invalidate it as against him~ In principle it 
is not the belligerent who creates an offense and imposes 
a penalty by his own "\vill and then by his own authority 
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empowers and directs the court of prize to enforce it. It 
is the law of nations, in its application to maritime war-
fare, which at the same time recognizes the right, of 
which the belligerent can avail himself sub modo, and 
makes violation of that right, when so availed of, an 
offense, and is the foundation and authority for the right 
and duty of the court of prize to condemn, if it finds the 
capture justified, unless that right has been reduced by 
statute or otherwise, or that duty has been limited by 
the waiver of his rights on the part of the sovereign of 
the captors. 
It is equally inadmissible to describe such an order in 
council as this as an executive measure of police on the 
part of the Cro\vn for the purpose of preventing an in-
convenient trade, or as an authority to a court of prize 
to punish neutrals for the enjoyment of their liberties and 
the exercise of their rights. Both descriptions, as is 
the way with descriptions arguendo, beg the question. 
Undoubtedly the right of retaliation exists. It is 
described in the Zamo·ra 79 ; it is decided in the Stigstad, 80 
as it had so often been decided by Sir William Scott over 
a century ago. It would be disastrous for the neutral, 
if this right were a mere executive right not subject to 
revie'v in a prize court; it would be a denial of the bellig-
erents' right, if it could be exercised only subject to a 
paramount and absolute right of neutrals to be free to 
carry on their trade with.out interference or inconvenience 
scott ' s deci .. This latter contention has already been negatived in the 
sions. 
Stigstad. 80 The argument in favor of the former, dra,vn 
from the decisions of Sir William Scott, seems to their 
lordships to be no less unacceptable. With the terms of 
. orders in coun- the proclamations and orders in council from 1806 to 
Cll, 1806-1812. 
1812 their lordships are not now concerned. They were 
such that the decisions on them in many cases involved 
not merely the use of the term "blockade" but discussion 
of, or at least allusion to, the nature of that right. It 
is, however, in their opinion a mistake to argue, as has 
been argued before them, that in those decisions the right 
to condemn was deemed to arise from the fact that the 
cases were cases of blockade., although the occasion for 
the blockade 'vas the passing of a retaliatory order. In 
their opinion Sir William Scott's doctrine consistently 
was that retaliation is a branch of the rights whiyh the 
711 [1916)2 A. C. 77. so [1919) A. C. 279. 
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law of nations recognizes as belonging to belligerents, and 
that it is as much enforceable by courts of prize as is the 
the right of blockade. They find no warrant or authority 
for holding that it is only enforceable by them when it 
chances to be exercised under the form or the conditions 
of a valid blockade. When once it is established that the 
conduct of the enemy gave occasion for the exercise of 
the right of retaliation, t.he real question is 'vhether the 
n1ode in which it has been exercised is such as to be 
invalid by reason of the burden 'vhich it in1poses on 
neutrals, a question preeminently one of fact and of 
degree. 
The onslaught upon shipping generally 'vhich the 
German Government announced and carried out at the 
beginning of 1917 is now matter of history. Proof of its 
formidable character, if proof 'vere needed, is to be found 
in a comparison between the retaliation orders in council 
of 1915 and of 1917, and their lordships take the recitals 
of the latter order as. sufficiently establishing the neces-
sity for further invoking the right of retaliation. They 
address themselves accordingly to what is the real 
question in the present appeal, namely, the character 
and the de()'ree of the danger and inconvenience to Dan~er and in· 
b con vemence to 
which the trade of neutrals was in fnct subjected by the neutral trade. 
enforcement of that order. They do not think it neces-
sary to criticize theoretic applications of the language of 
the order to distant seas, where the enemy had neither • 
trade nor shipping, a criterion which was argued for but 
which they deem inapplicable. Nor have they been 
unmindful of the fact that, to some extent, a retaliatory 
order visits on neutrals the consequences of others' 
wrongdoing, always disputed, though in the present case 
hardly disputable, and that the other belligerent, in his 
turn and also under the name of retaliation, may impose 
upon them fresh restrictions; but it seems to them that 
these disadvantages are inherent in the nature of this 
established right, are unavoidable under a system ,,,.hich 
is a historic growth and not a theoretic model of perfection, 
and are relevant in truth only to the question of degree. 
Accordingly they have taken the facts as they affected 
the trade in which the Leonora was engaged, and they 
have sincerely endeavored, as far as in them lay, to view 
these facts as they would have appeared to fair-minded 
and reasonable neutrals and to dismiss the righteous 
indignation which might well become those 'vho recall 
only the crisis of a desperate and terrible struggle. 
192 
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Compliance with the requirements of the order in coun-
cil would have involved the Leonora in difficulties, partly 
of a commercial and partly of a military character. Her 
voyage, and with it the ordinary expenses of her voyage, 
would have been enlarged, and the loss of time and pos-
sibly the length of the voyage might have been added to 
by the fact that no port or class of ports of call had been 
appointed for the purpose of the order. Inconvenience 
of this character seems to be inevitable under the cir-
cumstances. In so far as it is measurable entirely in 
terms of money, the extra expense is such as could be 
passed on to the parties liable to pay freight, and neither 
by itself nor in connection with other and more serioua 
matters should this kind of inconvenience be rated high. 
It is important to observe that the order does not for-
bid the carriage of the goods in question altogether. The 
neutral vessel may carry them at her peril, and that peril, 
so far as condemnation is concerned, may be averted if 
she calls at an appointed port.. The shipowner, no doubt, 
would say that if his ship is to make the call he will never 
be able to ship the cargo, for its chance of escape would 
be but small, and that if he is to get the cargo he must risk 
his ship and undertake to proceed direct to her destina-
tion. The contention is less formidable than it appears 
to be on the surface. Their lordships know well, and the 
late president with his experience kne\v incomparably 
better, with what ingenuity and artifice the origin of a 
cargo and every other damaging circumstance about it 
have been disguised and concealed where the prize of suc-
cess was high and the parties concerned were unfettered 
by scruples and inspired by no disinterested motives. 
They think that. the chance of escape in a British port of 
call must be measured against the enormous economic 
advantage to the enemy of carrying on this export trade 
for the support of his foreign exchange and the benefit of 
his much-needed imports, and they are convinced that 
the chance might well be sufficient to induce the pro-
moters of the trade both to pay, and indeed to prepay, 
whatever freight the shipowner might require in order to 
cover extra insurance and the costs of a protracted voy-
age, and to give to the actual shipper such favorable 
terms of purchase, insurance, or otherwise, as would lead 
him to expose his cargo to the risk of detection of its ori-
gin. They are far from thinking that compliance with 
the order would exclude neutrals from all the advantage 
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of the trade. If the voyages were fewer in number, they 
would tend to be more profitable singly, and in any case 
this particular traffic is but a very small part of the em-
ployment open, and legitimately so, to neutral traders, 
and the risk of its loss need not be regarded as of great 
moment. 
There is also some evidence though it is not very clear Dutch munid-
' 'palla.w. 
that Dutch municipal law forbade, under heavy penal-
ties, that such a deviation as would be required by a call 
at a British port should be made by a Dutch ship which 
had cleared for Sweden. If, however, the order in coun-
cil is in other respects valid, their lordships fail to see ho'v 
the rights of His Majesty under it can be diminished or 
the authority of an international court can be curtailed 
by local rules, whicli forbid particular nationals to com-
ply 'vith the order. If the neutral is inconvenienced by 
such a conflict of duty, the cause lies in the prescriptions 
of his own country's la,v, and does not involve any inva-
lidity in the order. 
F th 0 • • d h 0 h th to f No retaliation ur er, 1t IS pointe out t at, Wit e excep 1011 o by other allied 
France, the other allied powers did not find it necessary powers. 
to resort to a similar act of retaliation, and it is contended 
that, upon a comparison with the order of 1915 also, the 
consequences involved in a disregard of the order of 1 g 17 
were of unnecessary severity and were unjustifiable 0 
The first point appears to be covered by the rule that. on 
a question of policy-and the question whether the t in1e 
and occasion have arisen for resort to a further exercise 
of the right of retaliation is essentially a question of pol-
icy-a court of prize ought to accept as sufficient proof 
the public declarations of the responsible executive, but 
in any case the special n1aritime position of His Majesty 
in relation to that of his allies affords abundant ground for 
refusing to regard a different course pursued by those 
allies as a. reason for invalidating the order of 1917. I f 
the second point involves, as it seems to imply, the con-
tentiod that a belligerent must retaliate on his enemy, so 
far as neutrals are concerned, only on the terms of com-
pensating them for inconvenience, if any is sustained, and 
of rriaking it \Vorth their \Vhile to comply \Vith an order 
which they do not find to be advantageous to their par-
ticular interests, it is inconsistent with the \vhole theory 
on \Vhich the right of retaliation is exercised. The right 
of retaliation is a right of the belligerent, not a concession 
by the neutral. It is enjoyed by la'v and not on suffer-
• 
• 
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ance; and doubly so when, as in the present case, the 
outrageous conduct of the enemy might have been treated 
ns acts of \Var by all mankind. 
Accordingly the most mat~rial question in this case is 
the degree of risk to which the devin.tion required would 
subject a neutral vessel which sought to comply with the 
order. It is said, and with truth, that the German plan 
\vas by mine and by submarine to deny the North Sea. to 
trade; that the danger, prospective and actual, which 
that plan involved must be deemed to have been real and 
great, or else the justification of the order itself w·ould 
fail; and that the deviation, \vhich the Leonora n1ust 
have undertaken, \vould have involved crossing and 
recrossing the area of peril. 
J?egree of retal- Their lordships recall and apply ' what was said in the ntwn. · 
Stigstad, that in estimating the burden of the retaliation 
account must be taken of the gravity of the original 
offense which provoked it, and that it is material to con-
sider not only the burden which the neutral is called 
upon to bear, but the peril from which, at the price of 
that burden, it may be expected that beHigerent retalia-
tion \viii deliver him. It may be-let us pray that it 
may be so-that an order of this severity may never be 
needed, and therefore may never be justified again, for 
the right of retaliation is one to be sparingly exercised 
and to be strictly reviewed. Still the facts must be 
faced. Can there be a doubt that the original provoca-
tion here was as grave as any recorded in history; that 
it menaced and outraged neutrals as well as belligerents; 
and that neutrals had no escape from the peril, except 
by the successful and stringent employment of unusual 
measures, or by an inglorious assent to the enslavement 
of their trade~ Their lordships have none. 
On the evidence of attacks on vessels of all kinds and 
flags, hospital ships not excepted, which this record 
contains, it is plain that measures of retaliation and re-
pression would be fully justified in the interest of the 
common good, even at the cost of very considerable risk 
and inconvenience to neutrals in particular cases. Such 
a conclusion having been established, their lordships 
think that the burden of proof shifts, and that it was for 
the appellants to sho,v, if they desired, that the risk and 
inconvenience were in fact excessive, for the matter 
being one of degree it is not reasonable to require that 
the Crown, having proved so much affirmatively, should 
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further proceed to prove a negative and to show that the 
risk and inconvenience in any particular class of cases 
'vere not excessive. Much is made in the appellants' 
evidence of the fact that calling at a British port "\Vould 
have taken the Leonora across a German mine field, but 
it is very noticeable that throughout the case the very 
numerous instances of losses by German action are cases 
of losses by the action of submarines and not by mines. 
The appellants filed a series of affidavits, stating in iden-
tical terms that in proceeding to a British port of call 
vessels would incur very great risk of attack by sub-
marines, especially if unaccompanied by an armed 
-escort. Of the possibility of obtaining an armed escort 
or other similar protection they say nothing, apparently 
because they never had any intention of complying "\Yith 
the order in council, and therefore were not concerned to 
ascertain how much danger or how little their compliance 
would really involve. Proof of the amount of danger 
involved in crossing the mine field in itself is singularly 
lacking, but the fact is plain that after a voyage of no 
-extraordinary character the Leonora did reach Har,vich 
in safety. 
Under these circumstances their lordships see no su:ffi- Decision. 
·cient reason why, on a question of fact, as this question 
is, they should differ from the considered conclusion of 
the president. He was satisfied that the order in council 
did not involve greater hazard or prejudice to the neutral 
trade in question than was commensurate with the 
gravity of the enemy outrages and the common need for 
their repression, and their lordships are not minded te 
disturb his finding. The appeals accordingly fail. Their 
lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that they 
should be dismissed with costs. 
THE "DUSSELDORF." 
[PRIVY CouNCIL.] 
ON APPEAL FROM THE PRIZE COURT, ENGLAND. 
July 29, 1920. 
[1920] A. C. 1034. 
Appeal from that portion of a decree of the president 
of the admiralty division (in prize), 81 dated May 12, 
1919, which has disallowed a claim in respect of costs and 
11 [1919] p. 245. 
